Decoding messages from the yield curve by Eliana Balla et al.
B
ank supervisors get paid to worry — even when there
may be little to worry about. Historically, when the
yield curve inverts — that is, when short-
term interest rates rise higher than long-term interest rates
— banks have gotten into trouble. Short rates have exceeded
long rates consistently since July 2006, so supervisors 
are naturally growing restless. Are banks in the Fifth 
District and across the country potentially headed for 
problems?
The yield curve plots the return on a given type of debt
instrument — if held to maturity — across a range of matu-
rities. The curve is typically drawn using Treasury bills,
notes, and bonds because U.S. government debt is fairly
homogenous, enjoying virtually no default risk and active
secondary markets. 
The slope of the yield curve, also called the term spread,
is often measured by the difference between the rate on 
10-year Treasury notes and three-month Treasury bills. 
The term spread reflects the premium demanded by
investors for bearing greater interest-rate risk on long-term
Treasuries, as well as expectations about the future path of
interest rates on short-term Treasuries.
The yield curve almost always slopes upward — put
another way, long-term interest rates are generally higher
than short-term rates. But the curve can take other shapes.
It can be flat, for example, indicating that short- and long-
term Treasuries offer the same rates. It can also slope
downward or “invert,” indicating that short rates exceed
long rates.
An inverted yield curve is worrisome to bank supervisors
because it has typically put pressure on the margin between
interest earnings and funding costs. Such pressure can, in
turn, tempt bankers to take more risk. Both effects have the
potential to weaken bank conditions. 
An inverted yield curve worries supervisors for an 
additional reason. Inversion has typically signaled a coming
recession, and recessions undermine the ability of bank 
customers to repay their loans. 
The chain from inversion to recession to loan losses
shows up clearly in recent data. In July 2000, the yield curve
inverted, and a recession followed, starting in March 2001.
Between year-end 2000 and year-end 2002 the median
charge-off rate for U.S. banks — net loan losses divided by
total loans — grew by 50 percent before peaking at 0.16 per-
cent in December 2002.
The yield curve was relatively flat throughout most of
2006 before inverting last summer. Only twice in the last 20
years has the Treasury yield curve departed from its usual
shape for so long. More ominously, the curve has inverted
prior to every recession since 1960, and only once in the past
70 years has a recession not followed a period of inversion
lasting more than a month.
Term Spreads and NIMs
The term spread is a key driver of net interest margin
(NIM), which, in turn, is an important source of bank 
profits. Formally, NIM is measured as the difference
between the interest income from loans and securities and
the interest expense on deposits, divided by interest-earning
assets. Loans tend to have longer maturities than deposits,
so bankers make money when the long-term rates 
they charge loan customers exceed the short-term rates they
pay depositors.  As the yield curve begins to invert, however,
margins narrow and profitability suffers. The positive rela-
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traces the term spread and median
NIM for U.S. and Fifth District banks
from 1984 through March 2007.  
A persistently flat or inverted yield
curve can also lure bankers into assum-
ing more risk, in the hope, potentially




can take a number of
forms. A bank could,
for example, grow its
asset portfolio for a







banks have opted to
take more credit risk
— by weakening lend-
ing standards, offering
new lending products,
or lending in unfamiliar
territory. On average,
chasing yield has






has yet to produce a





Aclose look at Figure 1 
shows this weakening.
Between 2001 and
2004, the term spread
widened to a 13-year
high while margins 
for U.S. and Fifth District banks 
drifted downward. Then, in early
2004, median NIM began to 
climb while the spread narrowed 
dramatically. 
Analysis of bank-level data for
Maryland, Washington, D.C., West
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina suggests the factors
behind nationwide trends are also at
work in the Fifth District. Across the
country, banks have insulated margins
through more careful asset-liability
management and greater reliance on
long-term fixed-rate Federal Home
Loan Bank advances. Profits also 
have been shielded from narrowing
margins through greater reliance on
fees from services, most prominently
for larger banks. This trend can be
seen in Figure 2. Between year-end
1986 and year-end 2006, median fee
dependence (i.e., the portion of bank
income derived from fees) rose from
6.45 percent to 9.32 percent in the
nation and from 5.23 percent to 9.38
percent in the Fifth District. 
Although flat-to-negative term
spreads have yet to
squeeze margins, they
still could. Three times
since 1984 — in 1989,
2000, and 2006 — 
the yield curve flat-
tened or inverted and
Fifth District NIMs
declined sharply, but
with a lag. This experi-
ence suggests bank
margins and profits
could still be at risk
should the unusual




for loan losses implied
by a flat or inverted
yield curve requires a
look at the role 
of monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve
stabilizes prices by tar-
geting a key short-term
interest rate — the 
federal funds rate.
Suppose the Fed raises
the federal funds rate
to fight inflation. The
increase will ripple
across all interest rates
in financial markets,
but the rise in short
rates will be larger than
the rise in long rates.
Long rates will not rise
as much because they
reflect the average of
short rates expected to
prevail over time, and the Fed histori-
cally has cut the federal funds rate
with the passing of the inflation
threat. If the rise in the federal funds
rate is large, then short rates could
move above long rates. Such a hike is
also likely to slow the economy.
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Slope of the  
Yield Curve 
Figure 1
Treasury Yield Curve and Net Interest Margins (NIMs)
First Quarter 1984 – First Quarter 2007
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;  and
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Figure 2
Fee Income as a Proportion of Total Income
First Quarter 1984 – Fourth Quarter 2006
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mists Arturo Estrella of the New York
Fed and Frederic Mishkin, now a
Federal Reserve Board governor, 
and more recently, Estrella and Mary
Trubin, also of the New York 
Fed, documented the link between 





has also found a 
connection, though his 
work suggests that 
the forecasting ability 
of the term spread
improves dramatically
when the federal funds
rate is taken into
account to capture
information about cur-
rent monetary policy. 
On average, since
1990, the term spread
has been 1.72 percent,
and the federal funds
rate has been 4.37 
percent. Using Wright’s
model, these numbers
imply an average probability of reces-
sion of 2.5 percent. Since the yield
curve inverted in August 2006, the
spread has averaged -0.21 percent, and
the federal funds rate has averaged 5.25
percent, implying a recession proba-
bility of 42.8 percent, though most
analysts’ forecasts put the chances of
recession lower than that.  
Banks Are Solid
The recent behavior of the term spread
does not necessarily imply that bank
supervisors should leap into action to
head off loan-quality problems. An
inverted yield curve has preceded every
recession since 1960, as seen in Figure 3,
but a recession has not followed every
inversion. In September 1966, for
example, the term spread dipped below
zero and remained negative into
January 1967, yet no recession occurred.
In addition, the charge-off rate tends to
lag the business cycle, so supervisors
should have some time to prepare if
economic conditions weaken. Finally,
loan quality in the Fifth District and the
nation is strong by historical standards.
At the end of March 2007, the median
charge-off rate was 0.02 percent for
Fifth District banks and 0.01 percent
for U.S. banks as a whole. These figures
compare with the 20-year high of 0.77
percent for the entire banking sector in
December 1986. 
Supervisors have another factor 
on their side: the robust levels of 
equity capital in the banking sector.
Equity capital represents the owner’s
stake in the bank — the more capital,
the less temptation to chase yield. 
As of March 31, 2007, the median
leverage ratio — 
equity capital divided
by assets — was 10.16





and only seven banks
nationwide (of more
than 7,300) were weak-
ly capitalized, where
“weak” corresponds to
a simple leverage ratio
under 5 percent. 
Bottom Line 
Taken together, the 
evidence suggests that
the recent inversion of
the yield curve may 
not pose a threat to
bank safety and sound-
ness. Moreover, in early June the curve
“righted” itself — that is, the term
spread headed above zero — for the
first time in nearly a year. Still, past
experience combined with the lengthy
duration of the yield-curve inversion
suggests bank supervisors should
remain vigilant.  RF
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Figure 3
Yield-Curve Inversions and Recessions
June 1953 – March 2007
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; and
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